2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

10-1-2010

USA v. Glenn Peterson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Glenn Peterson" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 351.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/351

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 08-4793/08-4794
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GLENN PETERSEN,
Appellant No. 08-4793
_____________
No. 08-4794
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TREVOR DORSETT,
Appellant No. 08-4794
Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands
(Crim. Nos. 3-06-cr-00029-001, 3-06-cr-00029-002)
District Judge: Hon. Juan R. Sanchez
Argued: December 1, 2009

1

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FUENTES and NYGAARD,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 1, 2010)
DARREN JOHN-BAPTISE, ESQ. (Argued)
The Professional Building
5062 Fortets Gade Suites 11 & 12
St. Thomas, USVI 00802
Attorney for Appellant, Glenn Petersen
CHARLES S. RUSSELL, JR., ESQ. (Argued)
Moore, Dodson & Russell, P.C.
No. 14A Norre Gade
P.O. Box 310
St. Thomas, USVI 00804
Attorneys for Appellant, Trevor Dorsett
PAUL A. MURPHY, ESQ.
Acting United States Attorney for
the District of the Virgin Islands
ISHMAEL A. MEYERS, JR., ESQ. (Argued)
Assistant United States Attorney
5500 Veteran’s Drive, Suite 260
St. Thomas, USVI 00802
Attorneys for Appellee

OPINION
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McKEE, Chief Circuit Judge.
Glenn Petersen and Trevor Dorsett appeal their
convictions for possessing more than 500 grams of cocaine with
intent to distribute, and for aiding and abetting that possession.
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgments of
conviction.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.1

The circumstances leading to the defendants’ arrest and
conviction began as Virgin Islands Police Officers Angela
Brown and Steve Gibbons were monitoring surveillance
cameras in a police station on the island of St. John. Those
cameras had been deployed in “high crime areas” in Cruz Bay;
and fed into the police station where officers monitoring them

1

We review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government as verdict winner. United States v. Gambone,
314 F.3d 163, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2003).
3

could zoom in and out of a scene by manipulating a joystick.
The officers could also swivel the cameras in a complete 360
degree circle, thereby tracking movements of anyone they chose
to focus on.
While monitoring the cameras, Officer Brown
recognized Dorsett as she saw him standing on the sidewalk
directly across from a post office. As the officers observed
Dorsett, Petersen met him, and the two began walking toward
“Cap’s Place,” a local bar. When the two left the bar, the
officers saw that Petersen had a drink in one hand and a plastic
bag in the other. The officers zoomed in on the bag and saw
that it contained a brick-shaped object that appeared to be
heavy. As Petersen and Dorsett continued walking down the
street to the First Bank Building, Petersen passed the bag to
Dorsett. Dorsett kept the bag until they reached a short cut that
led to the Julius E. Sprauve School. They then moved out of
4

camera range when they took that short cut.
Officers Brown and Gibbons then left the station and
walked towards the school. As they did, they saw Dorsett and
Petersen get into a red Mitsubishi car and drive past the officers.
The officers then ran back to the station, got into a police car,
and attempted to follow Dorsett and Petersen. As they attempted
to pursue the Mitsubishi, Officer Brown radioed other officers
to be on the lookout for Dorsett and Petersen in the red car.
Officer Emile Proctor was heading towards the red
Mitsubishi when he saw it fail to stop at a stop sign. Officer
Proctor radioed to the other officers, informed them of what he
saw, and told them that he was going to make a traffic stop.
While attempting to catch up to the Mitsubishi, Officer Proctor
saw Dorsett throw a clear plastic bag that contained a white
substance out through the driver’s side window into an open
gutter. After the clear plastic bag was thrown into the gutter,
5

the Mitsubishi turned into a street that Officer Proctor knew to
be a dead end and Proctor stopped at the entrance of the street
to block the Mitsubishi’s exit. While doing this, he was able to
observe the clear plastic bag that had been thrown from the car
into the gutter. The Mitsubishi made a U-turn and then stopped
in front of Officer Proctor’s police car at about the same time
that Officers Brown and Gibbons were arriving at the scene.
They parked their car behind the Mitsubishi.
Officer Proctor ordered Dorsett and Petersen out of the
car as Officer Dennis Vanterpool arrived and was informed
about the clear plastic bag that was still in the gutter. As he
retrieved the bag, Vanterpool observed a rock-like substance
inside. He opened the bag and smelled what he believed to be
crack cocaine and then informed the other officers of his
discovery.

Officers Proctor and Vanterpool then frisked

Petersen and Dorsett. While conducting the pat-downs, Officer
6

Proctor noticed that both Dorsett and Petersen smelled of
marijuana, and Officer Vanterpool recovered a bag of marijuana
from Petersen’s pants pocket.
After Dorsett and Petersen were secured, Officers Brown
and Gibbons looked inside the Mitsubishi and immediately
noticed the odor of marijuana coming from inside. As Officer
Brown continued his visual inspection, he noticed what
appeared to be the plastic bag that he had previously seen
Dorsett and Petersen carrying as they walked down the street.
Brown inquired about the bag, but both Dorsett and Petersen
denied any knowledge of it. Officer Brown retrieved the bag
and saw that it contained brick-like objects covered by a white
powdery substance. Dorsett and Petersen were then arrested
and charged with possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute.
II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
7

On January 15, 2006, a grand jury returned a two count
indictment charging both Dorsett and Petersen with possessing
cocaine base (Count One) and cocaine hydrochloride (Count
Two) with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a public
school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 860, as well as
aiding and abetting each other and unknown others in the
commission of those offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2.
After the district court denied their motions to suppress
physical evidence, they proceeded to trial before a jury. The
government’s evidence at trial included the testimony of Eric

Jordan, a forensic chemist employed by the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency.

He testified that the bricks the

defendants were carrying contained cocaine hydrochloride that
had a gross weight of nearly one and a half kilograms (1,367.9
grams).

Officer Mark Joseph, a Virgin Islands Police

Department detective who is assigned to the Drug Enforcement
8

Task Force, testified that the drugs were packaged in a manner
that was not consistent with personal use.
At the conclusion of that trial, the district court granted
the defendants’ motions for judgment of acquittal and dismissed
Count One of the indictment. The jury could not reach a verdict
on Count Two and a mistrial was declared.
At the ensuing retrial, both defendants were convicted on
the charges contained in Count Two and sentenced to lengthy
prison terms after the court denied their post trial motions.
These appeals followed.
III. DISCUSSION
Dorsett argues that the district court erred in denying his
suppression motion, that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction, and that the district court erred in
refusing to give his proffered jury instruction on aiding and
abetting. Petersen also challenges the district court’s denial of
9

his suppression motion. He also contends that the district court
erred in sustaining his conviction for a lesser-included offense
because no lesser included offense instruction was given to the
jury.
The defendants’ challenge to the denial of their
suppression motions does not warrant discussion. Their only
argument in support of that claim is that all of the evidence
seized by the Officers should have been suppressed because the
evidence established that Officer Proctor did not see the
Mitsubishi run a stop sign. Thus, according to the defendants,
the traffic stop violated their Fourth Amendment rights.2 In
United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2006), we noted
that “the Supreme Court [has] established a bright-line rule that

2

Petersen does not argue that the seizure of marijuana
from his pants pocket violated the “plain feel” doctrine. See
United States v. Yamba, 506 F.3d 251, 256-60 (3d Cir. 2007)
(applying the “plain feel” doctrine established in Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)).
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any technical violation of a traffic code legitimizes a stop, even
if the stop is merely pretext for an investigation of some other
crime.” Id. at 252 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996)).
Petersen and Dorsett contend that surveillance videotape
evidence established that Officer Proctor did not see their car
run a stop sign. However, Officer Proctor clearly testified that
he did see the Mitsubishi run a stop sign, and the district court
credited the Officer’s testimony and held that the traffic stop
was proper.

“It is not for us to weigh the evidence or to

determine the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. Dent,
149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Thus, the district court did not err in denying
the motions to suppress.
Dorsett’s argument that there was insufficient evidence
to support his conviction does not merit much discussion either.
11

Officer Brown testified that she saw Dorsett handling the bag
containing the cocaine, and surveillance videotape established
that Dorsett had actual possession of the bag. That same plastic
bag was found in the vehicle just a few minutes later during the
stop. This is more than sufficient to sustain the conviction for
possession with intent to distribute.
We also reject both appellants’ challenges to the district
court’s jury instructions, although those claims require more
discussion.
Count Two of the indictment states:

On or about December 5, 2003, at
St. John, in the District of the
Virgin Islands, the defendants,
GLENN PETERSEN and
TREVOR DORSETT while aiding
and abetting one another, and
others unknown to the grand jury,
knowingly and intentionally
possessed with intent to distribute
a Schedule II narcotic controlled
substance, that is, more than five
12

hundred (500) grams of a mixture
and substance containing a
detectable amount of cocaine
hydrochloride, in violation of Title
21, United States Code, Section
841(a), within 1000 feet of a public
school, that is, the Julius Sprauve
School.
All in violation of Title 21, United
States Code, §§§ 841(a),
841(b)(1)(B)(iii), 860 and Title 18,
United States Code § 2.
As noted at the outset, Dorsett and Petersen were re-tried
on Count Two after their first trial resulted in a mistrial because
the jury could not agree on a verdict. The district court asked
the second jury to complete special verdict forms which
contained three questions. Those questions were identical for
each defendant except for the name on the form. The first jury
interrogatory was:
Do you unanimously find that the
Government has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant
13

[individual defendant’s name]
knowingly and intentionally
possessed with intent to distribute
a mixture or substance containing
cocaine?
The jury answered: “Yes,” on the verdict slips for both
defendants.
The second interrogatory was:
Do you unanimously find that the
Government has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant
[individual defendant’s name] was
within one thousand feet of a
school when he knowingly and
intentionally possessed with intent
to distribute a mixture or substance
containing cocaine?
On both defendants’ verdict forms, the jury answered: “No.”
The third interrogatory was:
Do you find that the Government
has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that the quantity of a mixture
or substance containing cocaine
that the defendant [individual
defendant’s name] knowingly and
14

intentionally possessed with intent
to distribute was 500 grams or
more?
On both defendants’ verdict forms, the jury answered: “Yes.”
Accordingly, Petersen and Dorsett were acquitted of charges
related to possessing more than 500 grams cocaine with intent
to distribute within 1000 feet of a schoolyard in violation of §
860(a), but they were both convicted of possession with intent
to distribute in violation of § 841(a)(1).
A. Petersen.
Following trial, Petersen moved for a judgment of
acquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial.3 He argued that
since he was charged with a single count of a violation of the
schoolyard statute, 21 U.S.C. § 860, the jury’s verdict
constituted an acquittal because the government failed to prove
an essential element of the crime charged. He further argued
3

Dorsett moved to join Petersen’s motion.
15

that conviction of possession with intent to distribute was
inappropriate because the district court never instructed the jury
that it could convict him of a lesser-included offense.
The district court denied Petersen’s motion and ruled that
Petersen was properly convicted of the lesser-included offense
of possession with intent to deliver even though the court did
not give a lesser-included offense charge to the jury. Peterson
now claims that was error. We disagree.
Petersen’s claim of error is as ironic as it is misguided.
He not only failed to request a lesser-included offense charge in
the district court and failed to object to the charge that was
given; during the charge conference, Petersen specifically
declined a lesser-included offense charge that the court offered
to give. Thus, we review the instruction that was given for
plain error. United States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 543-44 (3d

16

Cir. 2001).4
4

Ordinarily, “[i]f the party claiming error in the jury
instructions did not make a timely objection, we review for
plain error and we will reverse only if the trial court
committed error that was fundamental and highly prejudicial,
such that the instruction failed to provide the jury with
adequate guidance and the District Court’s refusal to consider
the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Alexander
v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 426 (3d Cir. 2000); see also United
States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 500 (3d Cir. 2006).
However, the situation here transcends mere waiver or
forfeiture of a legal argument because, as noted above,
Peterson not only failed to object to the district court’s jury
charge, he actually refused the court’s offer to give the lesser
included offense charge that he now says should have been
given. The situation is therefore more akin to an estoppel
than a waiver or forfeiture. Although it can clearly be argued
that he has lost any right to now claim that the court erred in
not giving the charge he told the court he did not want, we
believe that, given the very unique circumstances here, review
for plain error is appropriate. The alleged error occurred only
after the defendant was granted judgment of acquittal on
similar charges at his first trial, and his attack on the outcome
of the second trial is such that ignoring it now could
“seriously affect [] the . . . public reputation of judicial
proceedings[,]” United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 181
(3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207,
214 (3d Cir. 2008)), as it may appear that he has been
sentenced for a crime he was acquitted of. We caution,
(continued...)
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Under plain error review, relief is not warranted unless
there has been an error that is clear and affects substantial
rights. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999). The
error must be “an egregious error or a manifest miscarriage of
justice.” United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526, 530 (3d Cir.
1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As we

4

(...continued)
however, that circumstances are indeed rare that will cause us
to exercise our discretion to review a claim that a trial court
erred in not giving a jury charge that was offered, but refused
by the defendant.
Moreover, “[i]t is well-settled that arguments asserted
for the first time on appeal are deemed to be waived and
consequently are not susceptible to review in this Court absent
exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Rose, 538 F.3d
175, 179 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted; alternation in original). Exceptional circumstances
exist where, inter alia, “the public interest requires that the
new issue be heard on appeal.” Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools,
Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 1992). Since we have not yet
addressed the issue raised by Petersen, there is an institutional
consideration that can be viewed as “an exceptional
circumstance.” We therefore believe that “the public interest
requires that the new issue be heard on appeal.”
18

have suggested above, even if all of these prerequisites are met,
we will not exercise our discretion to reverse a case for plain
error unless the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Jones, 527 U.S.
at 389.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted,

alteration in original).
We review jury instructions as a whole and in light of the
evidence. When so viewed, jury instructions must “fairly and
adequately submit [] the issues in the case to the jury.” Unites
States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 373 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Nevertheless, a district
court has broad discretion in fashioning a jury charge as long as
it communicates “the substance of the law” so the jury is not
misled or confused. United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 235
(3d Cir. 1992).

19

The statute at issue here, 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), provides,
in relevant part, as follows:
Any person who violates section
841(a)(1) of this title . . . by
distributing, possessing with intent
to distribute, or manufacturing a
controlled substance in or on, or
within one thousand feet of, the
real property comprising a public
or private elementary, vocational,
or secondary school, or a public or
private college, junior college . . .
[is] subject to (1) twice the
maximum punishment authorized
by section 841(b) of this title; and
(2) at least twice any term of
supervised release authorized by
section 841 of this title for a first
offense.
Section 841(a)(1) provides, in relevant part:
Except as authorized by this
subchapter, it shall be unlawful for
any person knowingly or
intentionally –

20

(1) to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense
a controlled substance . . .
Section 860 is therefore a substantive offense that
requires proof of an element that is not included in § 841- proof
that the distribution, possession or manufacturing occurred
within 1000 feet of a schoolyard. United States v. McQuilkin,
78 F.3d 105, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, § 841(a)(1) is a lesser-included offense of
§ 860(a). United States v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 293, 295 (3d Cir.
2006); see also id. at 301 (“Because a conviction under § 860(a)
only requires a finding of one additional element, the 1,000-foot
proximity to a school, we agree that the possession of cocaine
base with the intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is
a lesser-included offense of possession with intent to distribute

21

within 1,000 feet of a school under 21 U.S.C. § 860(a).”).
Accordingly, a jury cannot find a defendant guilty of §
860(a) without first concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that
the government has established every element required under §
841(a)(1). Id.; see also United States v. Beltz, 385 F.3d 1158,
1162 (8th Cir. 2004) (“In fact one of the statutory elements of
§ 860 requires that § 841(a)(1) have been violated.”).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(c) provides, in
relevant part, as follows: “Lesser Offense or Attempt. A
defendant may be found guilty of . . . (1) an offense necessarily
included in the offense charged.” In Schmuck v. United States,
489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989), the Supreme Court explained that:
“one offense is not ‘necessarily included’ in another unless the
elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the
charged offense. Where the lesser offense requires an element

22

not required for the greater offense, no instruction is to be given
under Rule 31(c).”
The government contends that neither Rule 31(c) nor
Supreme Court precedent explicitly requires a lesser-included
offense charge if the instruction that is given includes the
greater offense. However, Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S.
205 (1973), seems, at first blush, to suggest otherwise.
There, a Native American was charged with assault with
intent to commit serious bodily injury under the Major Crimes
Act of 1885. That Act authorized the federal prosecution of a
Native American charged with committing certain specifically
enumerated offenses on a Reservation. Assault with intent to
commit serious bodily injury was one of the specifically
enumerated offenses. Keeble was charged with assault with
intent to commit serious bodily injury after getting into a fight

23

with his brother-in-law.
At the close of his trial, Keeble asked the district court to
instruct the jury that it could convict him of simple assault.
The district court refused because simple assault is not an
offense specifically enumerated in the Act.

Accordingly,

Keeble could not have been tried for simple assault in federal
court. The district court was affirmed on direct appeal, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to “the question of the
validity of denying the requested instruction.” 412 U.S. at 207.
The Supreme Court held that a lesser included offense
charge should have been given, if supported by the evidence.
Id. at 214. The Court explained:
Although the lesser included
offense doctrine developed at
common law to assist the
prosecution in cases where the
evidence failed to establish some

24

element of the offense originally
charged, it is now beyond dispute
that the defendant is entitled to an
instruction on a lesser included
offense if the evidence would
permit a jury rationally to find him
guilty of the lesser offense and
acquit him of the greater.
Id. at 208 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). The Court
continued:
[I]f the prosecution has not
established beyond a reasonable
doubt every element of the offense
charged, and if no lesser offense
instruction is offered, the jury
must, as a theoretical matter, return
a verdict of acquittal.
Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
Although Keeble might appear to support Petersen’s
argument, the Court’s statements must be understood in the
proper context. In Keeble, the Court was concerned with the
danger that the defendant may be found guilty of the charged

25

offense when the government has proven only the elements of
the lesser included offense. The Court explained:
[A] defendant is entitled to a lesser
offense instruction in this context
or any other – precisely because he
should not be exposed to the
substantial risk that the jury’s
practice will diverge from theory.
Where one of the elements of the
offense charged remains in doubt,
but the defendant is plainly guilty
of some offense, the jury is likely
to resolve its doubts in favor of
conviction.
Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212-13.
That danger is absent here because the special verdict
form enabled the jury to make a separate finding as to each
element of the charges against Petersen, and they did. Thus, the
mandate of Keeble does not apply.
Although we have not previously decided if a defendant

26

can be convicted of a lesser included offense where no such
instruction was given to the jury, we have held that a trial court
can enter a conviction on a lesser included offense under certain
conditions without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Although Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Josiah, 641 F.2d 1103
(3d Cir. 1981), did not involve the specific issue raised here, we
did explain:
A jury’s finding on all elements of the greater
offense is necessarily a finding of guilt on all
elements of the lesser offense, since a lesser
included offense consists of some of the elements
of the greater offense and does not require the
proof of any element not present in the greater
offense. A trial court therefore has authority to
enter a judgment of conviction on a lesser
included offense when it finds that an element
exclusive to the greater offense is not supported
by evidence sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding
of guilt on the greater offense.
Id. at 1108 (citations omitted).

27

Other circuit courts of appeal have addressed the question
of whether an appellate court can remand for entry of judgment
on a lesser included offense where no lesser included offense
charge was given after determining that there is insufficient
evidence to convict on the greater offense. Some of these courts
of appeals have declined or hesitated to reduce a conviction to
a lesser included offense when the district court did not give a
lesser included offense instruction. See United States v. Dhinsa,
243 F.3d 635, 676-77 (2d Cir. 2001) (refusing to affirm a
conviction for coercion based upon the government’s reasoning
that the evidence established a lesser included offense, because
the district court did not give a lesser included offense
instruction); United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th
Cir. 1994) (requiring a showing that the district court explicitly
instructed the jury that it could convict a defendant of lesser

28

included offense and an instruction setting forth the elements of
the lesser included offense); United States v. Vasquez-Chan, 978
F.2d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 1992) (same), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Nevils, 578 F3d. 1158 (9th Cir.
2010); United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1352 n.17
(10th Cir. 1991) (suggesting remand with an order to enter
judgment on a lesser included offense is appropriate only where
a lesser included offense instruction is given or where parties
concede conviction of the lesser included offense was proper);
United States v. Melton, 491 F.2d 45, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(refusing to order entry of judgment on a lesser included offense
where the defendant specifically rejected a lesser included
offense instruction and the government chose to seek conviction
on only the greater offense).
Other courts of appeals have held that a separate jury

29

instruction on a lesser included offense is not required as a
prerequisite for exercising their authority under 28 U.S.C. §
2106.5 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 380, 383 (10th
Cir. 1993) (remanding for resentencing on the lesser included
offense despite absence of a jury instruction); United States v.
Hunt, 129 F.3d 739, 745-46 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); United
States v. Cobb, 558 F.2d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding that
a conviction for bank robbery by putting in jeopardy the life of
any person by means of a dangerous weapon, which the court of
appeals found was not supported by substantial evidence, did,
nonetheless, establish each element for a conviction of the lesser
5

Which provides: “The Supreme Court or any other
court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set
aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court
lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the
cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment,
decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had
as may be just under the circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2106.

30

included offense of bank robbery by force or violence, and
remanding for resentencing on lesser included offense despite
absence of a lesser included offense charge).

In Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 445 (D.C.
Cir.1969), the court engaged in a different analysis. There,
rather than focusing on whether a lesser included offense charge
was given, the court focused on the nature of the offenses
involved and the prejudice to the defendant.

The court

construed 28 U.S.C. § 2106 as authorizing “federal appellate
courts to modify a criminal judgment to that of a lesser included
offense.” Id. at 450-51. However, it emphasized “that the
circumstances in which such authority may be exercised are
limited.” Id. at 451.
It must be clear (1) that the evidence adduced at
trial fails to support one or more elements of the
crime of which appellant was convicted, (2) that

31

such evidence sufficiently sustains all the
elements of the other offense, (3) that the latter is
a lesser included offense of the former, and (4)
that no undue prejudice will result to the accused.
Id.
Petersen argues that his conviction for knowingly and
intentionally possessing with intent to distribute more than 500
grams of cocaine is improper because, given the language of the
indictment, he had a “reasonable expectation” that he would
face liability only for a violation of the schoolyard statute and
not for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it. He
claims that since he was only on notice that he was required to
defend the schoolyard charge, a conviction for possessing with
intent to distribute denied him due process. Under the rather
unique circumstances here, that argument is without merit.
Count Two of the indictment clearly charges Petersen

32

with intentionally possessing more than 500 grams of cocaine
with intent to distribute, in violation of § 841(a)(1). Thus,
Petersen clearly knew that he had to defend against that charge
and that charge has absolutely nothing to do with proximity to
a schoolyard or § 860(a). Peterson could not possibly have
thought that he only had to defend against possessing cocaine
within 1000 feet of a schoolyard and that he need not be
concerned with defending against any charge that he possessed
cocaine with the intent to distribute. The very definition of the
schoolyard offense (§ 860(a)), references and incorporates the
latter offense, § 841(a)(1). The jury had to determine if Petersen
was guilty of violating § 841(a)(1), in deciding guilt under §
860(a). Moreover, the use of the special jury interrogatory
further removes the kind of risk that concerned the Supreme
Court in Keeble.

33

His related argument that he suffered a due process
deprivation because he prepared a defense against § 860(a) only
and not § 841(a)(1) is similarly flawed; it also appears to be
disingenuous. See United States v. Brozyna, 571 F.2d 742, 746
(2d Cir. 1978) (an indictment “required [defendant] to prepare
to defend not only against the charge but also against whatever
necessarily included offenses and attempts she could have been
convicted of under Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c).”).
His overarching contention that the district court erred
when it sustained his § 841(a)(1) conviction because the jury
was never given a lesser included offense charge is therefore
meritless under a somewhat modified Allison test.6 The first
prong of the Allison test involves the sufficiency of the evidence
pertaining to the crime of conviction. That inquiry is
6

We are not applying 28 U.S.C. § 2106.
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inapplicable here because Petersen was not convicted of the §
860 schoolyard charge. However, the remainder of the Allison
inquiry is relevant to assessing what, if any, impact the failure
to give a lesser included offense charge had on the outcome of
Petersen’s trial.

From the special verdict forms, it is clear that the jury
found that there was insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for violating § 860(a). Petersen does not argue that
there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for a
violation of § 841(a)(1). As we explained earlier, § 841(a)(1)
is a lesser included offense of § 860(a); in fact, § 860(a)
specifically incorporates § 841(a)(1). Not only can Petersen not
establish any undue prejudice, it is clear from this record
(especially given the court’s use of jury interrogatories) that he
can not establish any prejudice. Indeed, he does not claim that
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he suffered any prejudice. Rather, he is claiming that he had a
reasonable expectation that he would face liability only under
§ 860, and not under § 841(a)(1). However, as we have
explained, that argument is without merit.
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm Petersen’s
judgment of conviction.
B. Dorsett.
Dorsett also filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or,
in the alternative, for a new trial, arguing, inter alia, that the
district court’s aiding and abetting jury charge was improper
because it did not contain an adequate specific intent instruction.
Dorsett now argues that the district court erred in denying that
motion.7
7

“Generally, we review the district court’s refusal to
give certain jury instructions under an abuse of discretion
(continued...)
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Title 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) provides: “Whoever commits an
offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable
as a principal.” To convict a person of aiding and abetting, “the
government must prove [beyond a reasonable doubt]: (1) that
the substantive crime has been committed; and (2) that the
defendant charged with aiding and abetting knew of the
commission of the substantive offense and acted with intent to
facilitate it.” United States v. Soto, 539 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir.
2008). “To establish liability for a crime based on an aiding and
abetting theory, the government must prove that the underlying
crime occurred and that the defendant knew of the crime and
7

(...continued)

standard although where, as here, the question is whether the
jury instructions stated the proper legal standard, our review
is plenary.” United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d
Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
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attempted to facilitate it.” Gordon, 290 F.3d at 547 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “The government must
also prove that the defendant had the specific intent of
facilitating the crime . . . mere knowledge of the underlying
offense is not sufficient for conviction.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “Specific intent requires not
simply the general intent to accomplish an act with no particular
end in mind, but the additional deliberate and conscious
purpose of accomplishing a specific and prohibited result.”
Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F3d. 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2008).
At the charging conference, Dorsett asked the court to
instruct the jury that: “An aider and abettor must have some
interest in the criminal venture, and the prosecution must prove
the defendant’s intentional involvement in the crime with the
specific intent of making the crime succeed, and his
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participation in the commission of every element of the offense
as defined in these instructions.”

Rather than give that

instruction, the court gave the following intent instruction:
Evidence that a defendant was merely present
during the commission of the offense is not
enough for you to find a defendant guilty as an
aider and abettor.
In addition, . . . if the evidence shows that the
defendant knew that the offense was being
committed, or was about to be committed, but
does not also prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that it was the defendant’s intent and purpose to
aid or otherwise associate himself with the
offense, you may not find the defendant guilty of
the offense as an aider and abettor. The
government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant in some way participated
in the offense as something the defendant wished
to bring about and make succeed.
Dorsett appears to be arguing that because we said in
Gordon that “[t]he government must . . . prove that the
defendant had the specific intent of facilitating the crime,” 290
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F.3d at 547, the aiding and abetting instruction must contain the
words “specific intent.”
His argument fails for two reasons. First, the district
court used the Third Circuit’s Model Criminal Jury Instructions
§ 7.02 for aiding and abetting. The district court’s instruction
on intent is taken verbatim from those model instructions. We
have a hard time concluding that the use of our own model jury
instruction can constitute error, and nothing that Dorsett says
removes our doubt that use of such an instruction can constitute
error. Moreover, Dorsett does not even contend that the model
instruction is wrong. Second, we believe that the phrases “the
defendant’s intent and purpose to aid or otherwise associate
himself with the offense” and “that the defendant in some way
participated in the offense as something the defendant wished
to bring about and make succeed” sufficiently informed the jury
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that it had to find that Dorsett had the specific intent to aid and
abet the crime charged in the indictment.
Accordingly, we will also affirm Dorsett’s judgment of
conviction.
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